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Over a short period of time, the strengthening of law and governance
has become a major focus for international development organisations,
as well as for governments and organisations at the national level.
These are now devoting a substantial portion of development funds
into reform and capacity building programmes aimed at legal and ad-
ministrative institutions in transitional and developing countries.
However, the ‘building’ of legal and governance systems is proving to
be a dauntingly difficult and complex task and one in which the meth-
ods of approach are highly contested. It has been assumed that law
and governance reform is a technical, managerial and financial matter,
which allows for the export of laws and the transplantation of legal and
administrative structures. The disappointing results of such reforms
have illustrated, however, that not enough attention has been given to
how laws, policies, institutions and stakeholders operate in reality, in
their socio-political contexts. The uniqueness of individual countries,
sectors and institutions is often insufficiently understood, and the ac-
tual experiences with the myriad of law and governance programmes
and projects are not translated into knowledge on how law and govern-
ance reform promotes development.
In response, the Leiden University Press series on Law, Governance,
and Development brings together an interdisciplinary body of work
about the formation and functioning of systems of law and governance
in developing countries, and about interventions to strengthen them.
The series aims to engage academics, policy makers and practitioners
at the national and international level, thus attempting to stimulate le-
gal reform for development.
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‘[Judicial] reform is exceedingly important work in
the modern state. It is also exceedingly frustrating,
depressing, infuriating work, and it needs to be said
bluntly that it requires exceedingly competent,
thoughtful, imaginative people to do it’
Dan Lev
Introduction
At present, virtually everyone working in the field of development
agrees that the reform of mal-functioning court systems is central in
promoting good governance and the rule of law. A properly working
court system supports the realisation of many development goals – by
protecting human rights, resolving social conflict and implementing
state policies. In addition, a substantial scholarly literature argues that
courts play an important role in promoting economic growth, mainly
by protecting property rights. It is therefore unsurprising that interna-
tional donors have made available substantial funds for judicial reform,
even if neither of these two claims is undisputed (e.g. Dam 2006 and
Carothers 2005).
Unfortunately, however, the record of court reform efforts has not
been very heartening (Hammergren 2007). Courts seem to be even
more immune to reform attempts than executive government agencies.
The reason may be that they combine the obstacles common to reform
of institutions in the field of public administration with requirements
for independence and with dependence on the particular legal culture
they operate in. Reformers need to take into account a complex set of
relations courts have with other state agencies, other dispute resolvers,
and other actors within the state legal system (from the police to solici-
tors) – but they also depend heavily on such issues as the quality of leg-
islation and legal education.
Three types of reactions to this complexity have been common in
court reform programmes. The first response has been a plea for a
‘holistic’ approach, based on the argument that court reform is impos-
sible if not all aspects of the legal system are addressed at once. For
practical reasons this is very difficult, even if the first step – an assess-
ment of the entire legal system – has been made in several cases and
can be quite helpful.
Most attempts at court reform, however, have not been informed by
sufficient knowledge of the system concerned. This is due to the popu-
larity of the second approach, which could be labeled ‘tactical reforms’:
ad-hoc attempts to repair specific flaws in the judicial system without
carefully considering its relation to other issues (Hammergren 2007:
214-217). An example would be a project that involves introducing time
limits into a procedural code in order to reduce delays, which in
practice creates a situation where already overburdened judges no long-
er have time to properly consider a complex case. Since ‘tactical’ re-
forms have been the most common type of intervention, millions – if
not billions – of dollars have been spent without discernible results
(Carothers 2005: 4).
The ‘third way’ is a mixture of these two approaches, and can be la-
beled ‘strategic reform’. It resembles a tactical approach in scope, but
departs from a more careful analysis of the problem in its context so as
not to miss important issues that need to be addressed in an effort to
affect change (Hammergren 2007: 214-217). If well planned and imple-
mented, a proper sequence of strategic reforms may result in an ap-
proach that is fairly ‘holistic’.
This Research and Policy Note focuses on strategic reform and the
ideas underlying some of the most common elements of such reform.
It will discuss the objectives chosen and advantages and disadvantages
of the strategies employed to achieve them – if obviously only within
the limitations imposed by the scope of this note. The reader should
bear in mind at all times that these are insights derived from experi-
ences in particular cases and that they can neither be used as generali-
sations in any straightforward manner, nor as general prescriptions.
The main intention of the paper is to alert those involved in judicial re-
form to some of the pitfalls and choices related to particular types of
interventions.1 Its concluding remarks will moreover offer some obser-
vations on the political nature of judicial reform and on a model that
has been developed by Hammergren to promote a proper sequence of
interventions for judicial reform.
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Strategy Number 1: Promoting Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) as an Alternative and an
Incentive
The most extreme way of reforming courts is to replace them, and a
common approach to this end is to develop alternatives. This has led to
a variety of dispute-resolving mechanisms – ranging from mediation to
arbitration and tribunals administering justice – under the heading of
alternative dispute resolution.2 Although in Western countries the
ADR movement seems to be somewhat past its peak, ADR initiatives
in judicial reform in developing countries have continued unabatedly.
The main ideas driving ADR have been the following:
– it breaks the court monopoly and forces the courts to become more
serviceable;
– it leads to more consensual forms of dispute resolution and in-
creases the likelihood of parties accepting the outcome of a dispute;
– ADR is less prone to become thoroughly proceduralised and tends
to be cheaper, more flexible, and faster.
Regarding the first point, both the form of ADR, the actors involved
and the type of court cases supposed to be substituted should be of
concern. One should question whether ADR offers a genuine alterna-
tive, or whether the courts are so difficult to access that parties will set-
tle for ADR in the absence of any other forum for dispute resolution.
The danger is that this may force them to use a dispute-resolution sys-
tem that undermines the position of the weaker party.
Box 1: Lok Adalat
A good example are the so-called Lok Adalat in India, which provide
an alternative for the official court system. The arbitrator in these
cases is usually a retired magistrate, who provides some guaranteed
level of knowledge of the law and procedural protection. According to
Cranston, the Lok Adalat have contributed greatly to the effective reso-
lution of smaller cases, in particular motor cycle accidents (Cranston
1996). However, subsequent research by Galanter and Krishnan has
ð
demonstrated that the position of poor plaintiffs in these cases has
consistently been undermined by the Lok Adalat, because the latter
simply do not provide the amount of compensation the victim of an
accident is entitled to under the law (Galanter and Krishnan 2004).
One may argue that in many cases some compensation is better than
nothing, but one should be aware that the availability of ADR in situa-
tions such as this one has no effect on the courts whatsoever. In fact,
the courts are probably happy to get rid of many cases and will cer-
tainly not become more serviceable to potential plaintiffs; on the con-
trary, they may rather refer victims to ADR straightaway – as indeed
has happened in the Lok Adalat case. This further reduces the position
of plaintiffs, for the ‘shadow of the law’ wanes when cases on a particu-
lar subject are heard no more: the judiciary does not produce case law
and hence it no longer provides a clear normative point of reference
for disputing parties. In the end, this may undermine state law itself,
as it remains unimplemented. The conclusion therefore is that one
should pay close attention to the question of whether the form of ADR
introduced will be an incentive for courts to reform, or whether ADR
more or less stands on its own and should be seen as a full-fledged al-
ternative. Furthermore, one should be aware that ADR cannot provide
the same level of rule of law protection as courts are supposed to.
“One should question whether ADR offers a genuine
alternative, or whether the courts are so difficult to access
that parties will settle for ADR in the absence of any other
forum for dispute resolution.”
A similar caveat applies to the thesis that more consensual forms of
dispute resolution are preferable. This depends on the question of
whether the acceptability of the decision to the parties overrides the ob-
jectives of the state, for instance, the protection of women and children
against discriminatory social norms. Promoting ADR may moreover
lead to a shift of focus away from the public interest and more toward
private issues. And finally, because of its consensual nature ADR can
be used as a delay tactic.
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Box 2: Environmental Mediation
In a study on environmental mediation in Indonesia, Nicholson gives
several examples of polluting firms that had decided to engage in
ADR as a means of appeasing the local population without a clear
commitment to resolving the issues. Chemical plant PT Palur Raya,
for instance, entered the mediation process in order to prevent its fac-
tory from being burned down by angry farmers. This alleviated some
of the pressure being applied on the firm, which subsequently tried to
decelerate the mediation process by all means available. In the end
the government more or less coerced PT Palur Raya into an agree-
ment, but the entire process took several years. In other cases agree-
ments have been left unimplemented to this day (Nicholson forth-
coming).
The last proposition – that ADR is less prone to become thoroughly
proceduralised and tends to be cheaper, more flexible, and faster – is
probably the least problematic. However, it depends on the kind of dis-
pute concerned whether this is desirable or not. As soon as we turn to
disputes where basic human rights are at issue, one should begin to
question whether ADR should be allowed and whether precisely its
lack of procedures does not jeopardise the position of one of the parties
involved. Flexibility has its dangers. If we consider ADR in the realm
of criminal law, for instance when non-state courts apply customary
law, it is not difficult to see that this may be highly undesirable. In fact,
it may readily lead to ‘vigilante’ justice.
“While the literature indicates significant potential
advantages of introducing ADR, it depends on its form, the
field of dispute resolution into which it is introduced, and the
condition of the court system whether these will materialise.”
Box 3: ‘Linchations’
After the signing of the peace treaties in Guatemala in 1996, serious
efforts were made to reform the justice system. One of the efforts
made was the promotion of ADR – particularly of customary forms of
dispute resolution – which led to what may be called a decentralisa-
tion of the administration of justice. In practice, it also led to ‘mob
ð
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violence’ against perceived criminals, with many petty thieves being
shot, stoned, or torn to pieces. In one case the victim of such violence
was a Japanese tourist, who was suspected of planning to kidnap local
children when she took some pictures of them.
According to Handy, the main reason for these linchations lies in the
absence of the social cohesion and trust within communities required
for indigenous forms of justice or ADR to continue to perform effec-
tively. In the end, the promotion of some forms of ADR when com-
bined with the high levels of violence in Guatemala during the war,
has actually paved the way for rather brutal forms of popular justice
(Handy 2004, Sieder forthcoming).
In summary, while the literature indicates significant potential advan-
tages of introducing ADR, it depends on its form, the field of dispute
resolution into which it is introduced, and the condition of the court
system whether these will materialise. The advantages of cheap, rapid,
flexible and consensual dispute resolution are countered by a potential
lack of protection for weaker parties, a tendency to reduce the impact
of state policies by shifting cases away from the courts, and sometimes
uncontrolled forms of popular justice. Whether it makes sense to pro-
mote ADR thus depends on a thorough analysis of the field of disputes
and dispute resolution, and careful consideration of the question what
form of ADR may be suitable.3
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Strategy Number 2: Increasing Professionalism
The second court reform strategy – increasing professionalism – is the
oldest and politically least controversial one. Its aim is uncontested: of-
ficially every state supports timely, fair, and knowledgeable administra-
tion of justice. However, professionalism does have its political side, as
it tends to promote judicial independence and – to a lesser extent – ac-
countability among peers. On the one hand this offers an advantage
for donors, since projects supporting judicial professionalism may con-
tribute to realising goals that would otherwise remain unattainable –
for instance better protection of smallholder property rights – because
they go against the interests of the elite in the recipient country. On
the other hand, not recognising this political side may ultimately en-
danger projects, because politically adverse effects seldom go unnoticed
by those in power.
“Professionalism does have its political side, as it tends to
promote judicial independence and – to a lesser extent –
accountability among peers.”
Another issue which those concerned with stimulating professionalism
are not always aware of, is the vested interests in the organisations
themselves to obstruct professionalism. An increase in professionalism
may reduce the discretionary powers of judges and other court person-
nel and thus their rent-seeking opportunities. Awareness of this issue
may prevent the same mistakes that were made in the past by donors
who assumed that target groups always want to increase their levels of
professionalism.
The following section discusses some of the main sub-strategies un-
der this heading.
Reforming case management
This topic has been a ‘reformers’ darling’, as it is a relatively neutral
and technical intervention that promises substantial benefits in the
field of transparency and reduction of backlogs. Given the proclivity of
legal files to get lost, become incomplete, or remain shelved in back-
rooms, it seems logical to introduce changes to prevent this from hap-
pening, which will consequently result in more efficient court proce-
dures.
However, in practice interventions addressing this issue have more
often than not failed to deliver on their promises.
Box 4: Computers
This is particularly true regarding the introduction of technology in-
tended to speed up case management. As is now commonly accepted
among most donors, introducing computers should be the very last
step in a process of reform and not the first. This was not the com-
mon sequence in the early 1990s, when, for instance, in Mexico and
Costa Rica processes of case management were computerised
straightaway. Qualms of excessive bureaucratisation and the same
number of staff employed as before have created the impression that
these attempts were not very successful (Hammergren 2007: 64).
The experience in the 1990s with computerisation in the Indonesian
Supreme Court was far worse, however. Opposition among judges
against any increase in transparency ultimately led to a situation
where the computers stood idle, with their cables being gnawed away
by rats.
The main cause of problems with case management reforms is that
they contradict the personal interests of court personnel (e.g. Messick
1999).4 Accepting bribes to speed up the processing of a case is often
a major source of income for court personnel, and thus they remain
very reluctant to use technologies and procedures that reduce their abil-
ity to manipulate the system. As a result, such changes can only be ef-
fective if they are accompanied by genuine incentives for court staff to
co-operate – beyond the sheer pleasure of using computers.
“The main cause of problems with case management reforms
is that they contradict the personal interests of court
personnel.”
The key to success in introducing such reforms is in the first place
genuine support from the judges, or at least from the leadership of the
court. These have the actual means to enforce procedures and if they
are not willing to do so, for instance because they are involved in the
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‘file managing business’ themselves, a project of this kind makes little
sense. One should also be aware that judges may be reluctant to take
action against their staff, in which case not much is to be expected of
such reform either (Hammergren 2007: 63).
Another crucial issue is that the technologies and procedures intro-
duced must be properly adjusted to their environment. This seems ob-
vious, but often reformers have been keen on introducing the most no-
vel, accomplished technology instead of more simple, less fashionable
ones, that are often better tested and easier to modify. One problem
here is that those at the receiving end usually also prefer the latest
state-of-the-art tools, which may make it difficult to promote a more
pragmatic solution. However, the most sophisticated technologies or
management procedures are not going to work in unruly surround-
ings, where even typewriters are not commonly used yet.
Finally, external pressure in these cases may be helpful to overcome
resistance. In particular if courts are large, the court leadership needs
to promote an effective system for reporting case management irregu-
larities to ensure that they get proper information on what is happen-
ing in their own organisation. This also applies to the judiciary as a
whole: if the Supreme Court or a judicial council is willing and trying
to improve case management they need accurate data on the dealings
of the lower courts. Opportunities for complaints may moreover be-
come focal points for the press to acquire information and thus pro-
mote pressure from the media.
Training
Another ‘apolitical’ issue is judicial training, which probably accounts
for its popularity – at least in part. This does not mean that judicial
training is unproblematic. The main issue is that donor-funded pro-
grammes can seldom, if ever, provide training activities of a structural
nature. The result has been that such training is mostly of an inciden-
tal nature and will thus have little effect if it concerns general legal
training. Moreover, unless changes are made to the institution where
the trainees are employed, they will usually not have much opportunity
to apply their knowledge in practice.
“Training should fulfil a need; it should not be a reward.”
This effect may be exacerbated by transfer policies. Some reports reveal
that judges trained in a particular field – i.e. bankruptcy law – may la-
ter end up being transferred to positions where their newly acquired
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expertise is no longer of any use to them. This issue should be taken
into account when designing a training programme. The selection pro-
cedure for the training is also important, especially if the training takes
place abroad. If this matter is left to the receiving party, the pro-
gramme runs the risk of turning into a travel scheme facilitating short
holidays for judges on the verge of retirement. Training should fulfil a
need; it should not be a reward.
This is not to say, of course, that judicial training programmes are
totally worthless. In particular if new courts or new laws have been in-
troduced, training programmes can be vital for the development of the
legal field involved.
Box 5: Commercial Courts
A good illustration of this involves the training of judges for the com-
mercial courts established in Indonesia in the aftermath of the 1998
economic crisis. Sponsored by the IMF, but designed by experts with
in-depth knowledge of the Indonesian judicial system, the commercial
courts were established to implement the new Bankruptcy Act which
was to aid in the restructuring of the massive debts incurred during
the crisis. While the courts have ultimately not brought the benefits in-
tended, a thorough evaluation of their judgments has demonstrated
that the training they had received in the administering of the Bank-
ruptcy Act had been effective, in the sense that the large majority of
cases were decided in conformity with the relevant legal provisions
(Bedner 2008: 160-161).
An additional advantage of such training programmes is that the pro-
spect of the training itself, combined with the perspective of broaden-
ing one’s judicial horizons can become a major incentive to apply for a
position on a new court or in a new field of jurisdiction. This, in turn,
provides an opportunity to apply stricter selection criteria (Bedner
2001: 203-204).
Furthermore, the scale of training activities is important. Sometimes
massive programmes are implemented, but most programmes tend to
have a hit-and-run character. Pervasive effects obviously require a much
more serious commitment from donor agencies than they are often
able to provide.
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Box 6: Judicial training centres
An interesting attempt to overcome this problem of scale of training
activities has been donor initiatives to establish judicial training cen-
tres. In Honduras (USAID) and Sri Lanka (The Asia Foundation) poli-
tical support for these centres has been less than overwhelming and
as a result they have not brought the expected benefits. By contrast,
the judicial training institute in Uruguay seems to have fared better.
The key here has been structural political support for the entire reform
programme, making judicial training a requirement for new judges
(Blair and Hansen 1994). The experience in El Salvador has also been
rather favourable. An important reason seems to be that in this case
USAID had made a thorough assessment of problems in the legal sys-
tem beforehand. Another helpful detail has been the availability of
‘trainers’ from the well-institutionalised judicial school in Costa Rica,
which reduced linguistic and institutional barriers (Hammergren 1998:
35-42).
A final advantage offered by a training programme is that it can be car-
ried out even in situations where the judicial institution itself is weak,
and incapable of sustaining reform. This applies in particular to weak
states and post-conflict situations.5
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Strategy Number 3: Increasing Court Accountability
Making courts and judges more accountable is a major objective of var-
ious strategies in judicial reform. While virtually every judicial reform
programme aims to increase the level of professionalism, accountabil-
ity is not often referred to – even if usually the two are closely con-
nected. The main reason is probably that courts are generally averse to
accountability mechanisms, which they consider an attack on their in-
dependence. This is not only the case in developing countries, for the
issue has been hotly debated in many Western countries as well (Conti-
ni and Mohr 2008).
There are two reasons why accountability is a particularly salient is-
sue in developing countries. The first is that – unlike in most Western
countries – judicial independence in developing countries is often in
actual danger. In spite of the third wave of democratisation, developing
states are usually still executive-heavy and thus an increase in judicial
accountability may provide governments with the tools to twist judicial
arms. For instance, performance indicators may be used to remove
judges considered politically hostile to the government (e.g. Bedner
2001: 209-210).
“Courts are generally averse to accountability mechanisms,
which they consider an attack on their independence.”
The other issue is that in many developing countries judicial corrup-
tion is a serious problem. Judges here maintain a personal or an insti-
tutional interest in subverting attempts to increase their accountability,
which they often do by invoking their independence. In this manner
‘political’ independence is used to foster ‘social’ dependence, which al-
lows judges to proceed with their corrupt practices.
To summarise, on the one hand accountability mechanisms are im-
portant to counter judicial corruption and to increase court efficiency
in view of the generally limited resources available to the judiciary. On
the other hand, however, they may readily endanger judicial political
independence, which must be avoided. Therefore, the question of what
forms of accountability mechanisms are suitable needs careful consid-
eration. I will now briefly address the main ‘direct’ forms of interven-
tions in judicial development programmes to increase judicial indepen-
dence, and discuss to what extent they can be effective and where the
possible dangers lie.
Reform of Procedural Law
The reform of procedural law is a good example of a relatively ‘safe’ ap-
proach to court reform, with the intention of increasing the account-
ability of the judiciary, making the courts easier to access, and bolster-
ing efficiency. Because red tape in the court systems of most develop-
ing countries remains as serious a problem as it is in executive
government agencies, simplifying or streamlining procedural laws
seems to be an attractive option. Accountability is served mainly
through attempts made to increase the transparency of procedures.
The literature reveals two caveats, however. The first is that many as-
pects of procedural law serve to protect the needs and interests of the
disputing parties. One should therefore not immediately perceive every
apparently formalistic rule as cumbersome only, and before suggesting
changes one ought to first explore these needs and interests. This is
usually more obvious in the case of criminal law than in civil law, but
it is an issue in civil law as well, particularly if power disparities be-
tween the disputing parties are wide – not unlike the situation we
found with regard to ADR.
“Many aspects of procedural law serve to protect the needs
and interests of the disputing parties. One should therefore
not immediately perceive every apparently formalistic rule as
cumbersome only, and before suggesting changes one ought
to first explore these needs and interests.”
Box 7: The value of formalism
The first projects implemented under the aegis of law and develop-
ment in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s, tended to
undermine the constitutional protection of citizens which was in-
herent in the formalistic attitude of judges – in criminal law and in
cases against the government. The US lawyers involved in these
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programmes proposed a far more instrumental and pragmatic ap-
proach to court procedural law, which may be beneficial when judges
tend to take a critical view of the government. However, these judges
failed to do so and thus the effect was the erosion of attitudes sup-
porting judicial independence and the protection of weaker parties –
in short the opposite effect of what the reformers had intended (Gard-
ner 1980).
The second caveat involves the fact that procedural reformers tend to
underestimate the personal interest of judges and other court person-
nel in maintaining intricate procedural rules. Simply put, these rules
and regulations enable them to benefit financially. Although perhaps
morally reprehensible, this tends to be a relatively benign form of cor-
ruption. Given the generally under-funded state of courts in developing
countries, their employment of the opportunities offered by strict pro-
cedures to help expedite the passage of a case is not nearly as proble-
matic as the actual acceptance of bribes to produce a favourable judg-
ment.6 It shows once again that one must be careful not to approach
typically legal reforms as isolated cases. Instead one should evaluate
their role and function in the organisation and informal workings of
the court. Procedural change may very well lead to more serious and
uncontrollable forms of corruption.
Nonetheless, reforms in procedural law may be highly beneficial to
the weaker parties in disputes without endangering legal certainty. This
applies in particular to laws governing the admission of evidence in ci-
vil and administrative courts. Good examples include the fields of con-
sumer and environmental law, where evidentiary rules very often re-
strict those seeking redress of injustices.
Box 8: Evidential formalism
Often accused of being excessively formal, Indonesian judges indeed
sometimes demonstrate an extreme preference for documentary evi-
dence. A good example are pollution cases, where the victims are gen-
erally urban poor or small peasants. Judges usually dismiss their testi-
mony concerning foul-smelling, strangely coloured water, illnesses
contracted after bathing in a river, and rice fields that no longer yield
a harvest – instead they will demand as evidence administrative warn-
ings issued by the executive and sampling outcomes based on strict
procedures. In many other countries the burden of proof in such
cases is shifted to the supposed polluter, who is required to record
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the amount of sludge produced and demonstrate how he has disposed
of it. The introduction of this regulation in Indonesia would greatly
benefit the position of plaintiffs in such cases, but also positively effect
environmental law enforcement more generally (Bedner 2007).
Such changes do require sound knowledge of the situation at hand,
but the danger that their implementation will backfire is considerably
smaller than in cases involving sweeping reforms of procedural law.
Once again, the key to success and the reduction of risks involves a
thorough knowledge of both the law and the practice it sustains.
Publication of judgments
The two most traditional forms of promoting judicial accountability are
the openness of the court and the publication of judgments. Openness
of the court is seldom mentioned in the literature as a serious problem,
with the exception of cases allegedly involving state security. However,
publication of judgments is a problem in many countries.
Sometimes the situation has deteriorated to the extent that court
judgments are no longer even considered as something that should be
available to the general public, but instead are perceived as private
documents belonging to the disputing parties – who in the worst of
cases do not even get the judgment themselves (Pompe 2005: 435-
441).7
The situation is clearly most problematic when it concerns judg-
ments made by the highest judges. This has consequences that reach
far beyond the mere interest of the parties involved in the case, as it
disempowers the ‘forum of jurists’ to supervise and criticise legal devel-
opments and affects the very nature of legal education.
Box 9: The role of case law
While differences between common and civil law jurisdiction tend to
be exaggerated, this problem seems indeed more widespread in coun-
tries with a civil law heritage. The common law legal education instils
judge with such an aversion for statutes while exalting their own,
judge-made law, that eliminating case law really flies in the face of
everything they stand for. By contrast, civil law jurisprudence, with its
emphasis on statutory law, tends to make judges less concerned
about the general availability of case law. Moreover, the common law
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heritage has created an international forum, where judges and other
lawyers critically follow the development of jurisprudence in other
common law jurisdictions. This is most evident in cases where the ju-
diciary is pressured by the executive. For example, when Pakistan's
Chief Justice Chaudry was dismissed it not only led to an outcry from
fellow judges, but from the entire legal profession as well. This may
seem somewhat unrelated to the issue of the publication of judg-
ments, but case law is one of the main focal points of the legal pro-
fessions and legal education. The absence of case law leads to the se-
vering of the oversight function of jurists and the ‘common bond’ be-
tween lawyers in general that is inherent in shared understandings of
the law.
Moreover, a situation where case law is not generally available is detri-
mental to legal certainty and consequently increases the discretionary
powers of judges. In short, this particular issue should be a major con-
cern of judicial reform.
Within the judiciary, oversight that involves the evaluation of judg-
ments is obviously another matter. Appellate courts do get to evaluate
judgments and may therefore promote unification. However, the great-
er the number of courts within one system, the more judges sitting in
the highest court and the greater the backlog of cases, the more diffi-
cult it becomes to maintain some form of unity.
“a situation where case law is not generally available is
detrimental to legal certainty and consequently increases the
discretionary powers of judges.”
Box 10: Indian backlogs
In 2003 the widely respected Supreme Court of India, composed of
26 judges, was struggling with a backlog of 20,000 cases, one Indian
Supreme Court judge disposing of more than 2000 cases annually.
When in 2007 the backlog had increased to more than 40,000 cases,
the government proposed to raise the number of judges from 26 to
30 (Bill no. 41 of 2008).
However, the seriousness of this situation is small compared to In-
dia's 18 High Courts which in 2003 were faced with a backlog of more
than three million cases (Krishnan 2003).
It will be clear that under such conditions higher courts can hardly of-
fer any clear guidance to lower courts by means of case law.
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One should be aware that data concerning the uniformity in judging
are scant almost everywhere. Cases are often randomly selected for
publication on the basis of unclear criteria and generally speaking one
may safely conclude that there is a serious knowledge gap regarding ac-
tual court performance from a legal point of view.8 The availability of
computers means a potential revolution in this situation, and may very
well lead to a major impetus for reform – if indeed such a system can
be instituted.
Box 11: Uploading Supreme Court decisions
With support of several donors, including AusAID and the EU, Indo-
nesia's Supreme Court has now adopted a system where every judg-
ment passed will be automatically uploaded onto the Supreme Court
website. As a result anyone who is interested can access them and
thus an enormous amount of information on the state of Indonesian
legal reasoning has become available. The main reason this effort has
not ended up like the situation that occurred in the 1990s (see box 4)
is that the Supreme Court leadership has supported this move. The
challenge now is to make selections from this massive amount of
data so that it can be used for the discussion of legal developments
in the literature and for teaching purposes. This should eventually re-
volutionise Indonesian legal education, which currently focuses mainly
on statutory law and cases from prior to 1975.
Of course one should in this case as with procedural changes, never
underestimate how vested interests may ultimately block attempted re-
form. Not only are judges often unwilling to submit themselves to ex-
ternal scrutiny, many academics may be averse to writing articles and
adjusting their teaching methods because this will divert their energies
from side jobs which allow them to earn often badly needed extra in-
come. In short, related fields, such as education, need to be reformed
as well in order to acquire the benefits of publication of judgments.
“Never underestimate how vested interests may ultimately
block attempted reform.”
Recruitment
The recruiting of new judges is an issue that donors involved in reform
programmes can usually only address peripherally, but sometimes
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their programmes provide them with the leverage needed to influence
recruitment practices. One of the most promising ways to use this op-
portunity has been to open up the judiciary to non-career judges.
This matter is of vital interest in the context of judicial accountabil-
ity, as it introduces candidates from outside the judiciary to positions
within, which may lead to new forms of professional accountability. In
particular in countries from the civil law tradition judiciaries have tra-
ditionally been closed shops, composed of career judges who have been
drawn directly from graduates of the universities. In this regard, the
generally stronger professional bonds between the public and private
legal professions in countries with a common law background often
provide a more favourable point of departure.
“It introduces candidates from outside the judiciary to
positions within, which may lead to new forms of professional
accountability.”
One should be aware of the general aversion that career judges have to
allowing outsiders into their ranks. This may even lead to judges em-
ploying cunning legislative tactics to prevent such access.
Box 12: Resistance against outsiders
The first case involving the Indonesian judiciary being exposed to a re-
gime that allowed the recruitment of non-career graduates were the
Indonesian administrative courts, established in 1991. For the first
time non-career judges could be appointed, despite protests from the
judges' trade union during hearings in Parliament. In practice, how-
ever, this provision has remained a dead letter, because the main draf-
ter of the law – a judge himself – made sure that regardless of the
professional experience of the outsider the latter would have to start
his judicial career at the bottom in the lowest court. (Bedner 2001:
199 n. 39)
A more common problem is that judicial salaries are usually so unat-
tractive when compared to those in the higher echelons of the private
legal profession that it becomes difficult to attract candidates from this
pool. A potential solution is to allow outsiders to serve as judges-in-ad-
hoc. There have been positive experiences with this option, for instance
in the case of the human rights court and the corruption court in Indo-
nesia (Cammack forthcoming, Tahyar forthcoming).
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Generally speaking, the possibilities to open up courts to outsiders
are better in cases involving newly established courts than in more tra-
ditional or settled ones. The best example is probably the constitutional
courts which have spread rapidly across the globe in recent years and
which usually include judges from a variety of backgrounds (e.g. Gins-
burg 2003).
The other side of this coin is that if it is not handled with some cir-
cumspection, allowing outsiders to be appointed to higher positions in
the court system creates a situation where the judiciary is easily ma-
nipulated and corrupted. In particular the appointment of chief justices
by the executive may be used as a shortcut to gaining control of the ju-
diciary. It is no coincidence that the procedure regarding the appoint-
ment of Justices at the US Supreme Court is heavily politicised and in-
cludes numerous checks and balances. Unfortunately, the list of exam-
ples of the manipulation of nomination procedures for supreme court
appointments around the world is long and dismal.
Career Management
In the previous section we have already touched on some of the issues
concerning judicial careers. Career management in the judiciary is par-
ticularly sensitive because of its relation with judicial independence
and judges’ aversion to being held accountable other than via official
forms of appeal. The question is whether appeals yield sufficient in-
sight into the competence of individual judges as a basis for career
management. Especially if justice is administered by councils of
judges, it becomes quite difficult to assess the individual capacities of
the judge.
The consequence of not having the proper means of evaluating an
individual judge’s performance, is that the only people aware of an in-
dividual judge’s abilities are his fellow colleagues. The chairman of the
court in particular assumes a central position in career management,
as he is usually the one on whose information those in charge of judi-
cial career management rely. In order to prevent this classic principal-
agent situation from developing, alternatives are necessary to avoid this
type of a monopoly of information.9
One of the most remarkable developments in this field is the rapid
proliferation of judicial councils. The main reason for their popularity
is that they are supposed to be more suitable for managing judicial ca-
reers than ministries of justice, because, as separate institutions, they
are more independent of government influence. At the same time, they
may prevent supreme courts from having to fulfil various management
tasks for which the latter are not fully equipped. However, in some
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cases an important reason for their establishment has been that the su-
preme courts themselves are deemed so corrupt that they cannot be en-
trusted this task.
The difficulty with evaluating the performance of judicial councils is
that they differ so much in composition and function. While some are
solely concerned with the selection of supreme court candidates or in-
vestigating corruption charges, others control the entire judicial trans-
fer system. Again, which tasks can better be performed by a special
body other than the supreme court or the ministry of justice greatly de-
pends on the situation in the country concerned.
“Understanding career systems is not only important when
deciding on the kinds of interventions that may actually lead
to improvements, but also for understanding how judicial
corruption works.”
A particular problem for judicial councils in managing judicial careers
is that they have even greater difficulties in gaining insight into the ca-
pacities of judges than supreme courts. An obvious first step would be
to evaluate judgments, but as we have seen in many systems it is diffi-
cult to link judgments to individual judges. This means that in order
to function effectively judicial councils need an entire set of criteria
and tools to assess judicial performance. Moreover, the leading systems
of judiciary quality management – those developed in the US and the
Netherlands – evaluate courts, not judges. The external evaluation of
individual judges is highly controversial and risky.
Understanding career systems is not only important when deciding
on the kinds of interventions that may actually lead to improvements,
but also for understanding how judicial corruption works. While there
seems to be a basic recognition that low salaries among the judiciary
leads to susceptibility of illicit payments, the link to career manage-
ment is not always made. If judges are transferred from one court to
another or from one part of the country to another, there is a serious
probability that corruption schemes have come into existence which
enable judges to influence this process. In other words, judges pay for
a transfer to an ‘attractive’ court. A clear system of rules and require-
ments may hinder this process, but is unlikely to fully curb it.
The main consequence of such an illicit transfer system is not only
that it diverts attention from merit-based criteria, but also that it rein-
forces ‘ordinary’ corruption. In order to raise the amounts of money
needed for a favourable transfer, judges inevitably seek extra money
from litigants. The system is not unlike tax farming, but then in a
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more illicit form. In order to reform this realm, one needs to be aware
of the informal ranking of courts before effective measures can even be
considered.
Court monitoring
A useful development for aiding in the resolution of problems concern-
ing the accountability of courts has been the establishment of special
‘court watch’ institutions. Their activities consist of monitoring pro-
ceedings in selected cases in selected courts, and their mere presence
may influence the approach taken by judges.
While helpful in principle, budget limitations constitute a significant
barrier to the effectiveness of court watch institutions. A careful selec-
tion of cases is essential, as otherwise their influence will be negligible.
Their potential effectiveness further depends on the accessibility of
court decisions. If these are available, the ambit of their activities may
become much wider.
Another important factor is the possibility for such organisations to
co-operate with other NGOs, which may provide them with important
data on the cases concerned. Operating on their own, they run a ser-
ious risk of having to reinvent the wheel and spend large amounts of
time and effort on gaining knowledge of basic legal issues underlying
the cases they look at. A reportedly helpful alternative is the involve-
ment of retired judges, prosecutors or solicitors in their activities.10
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Concluding remarks
This Research & Policy Note has attempted to point out some of the
pitfalls connected to interventions aimed at improving judicial perfor-
mance, or promoting ADR. As stated at the outset, its intention has
not been to provide a concise guide to judicial reform, but to alert those
involved in reform efforts to certain linkages between topics not always
considered as interconnected.
Rather than rehashing all of these suggestions once again, this final
section lists a few general points concerning the decision-making pro-
cess of whether to start a judicial reform programme or not, and the
‘sequence’ that should be followed by those involved in such projects
in order to maximise their effectiveness.
The first point is that to a large extent the political situation deter-
mines the kinds of interventions that may be successful. Recent studies
on new constitutional courts have indicated that these courts can only
be established in democracies with some likelihood of the government
being replaced by its political opponents after the next elections (Gins-
berg 2003). Similar arguments may apply to courts on a broader level.
If a government is unsympathetic to judicial reform, there is no chance
of introducing sweeping changes, unless significant political opposition
can be mounted against such a government. Of course, donor interven-
tions themselves can be part of that clout, but for a donor to make such
a decision requires a considerable amount of knowledge of the political
situation beforehand.
The second point is that as any other organisation judiciaries, like
fish, ‘rot from the head’, and their renewal should begin from the top
down as well. Irrespective of the political situation, if the leadership of
the judiciary blocks reform little is likely to happen and the replace-
ment of the resistant leadership in that case should override all other
concerns. On the other hand, it may be wise in such situations to in-
vest in judges on the lower parts of the courts’ hierarchy while waiting
for higher level changes to occur, as otherwise no alternative infrastruc-
ture will be available for court reform when the windows of opportu-
nity start to open.
The third and final point is the matter of sequencing. We have al-
ready paid some attention to this, but its importance cannot be overesti-
mated. The following list developed by Linn Hammergren after a long
career in judicial reform provides an excellent device for this purpose:
Box 13: Sequencing
Step 1 – Knowledge Building and Application as an Input to Goal
Definition
Step 2 – Constructing Demand and Designing Interventions and
Objectives around an Adequate Knowledge Base
Step 3 – Strengthening Organizational Capacity for Self-Regulation
Step 4 – Increasing Internal Efficiency and Attacking Traditional Vices
Step 5 – Increasing Efficacy by Differentiating Tasks
Step 6 – Reconsidering the Organizational Mandate and Alternatives
for Handling It
Step 7 – Taking on New Tasks and Redefining the Organizational
Clientele
Source: Hammergren 2007
According to its author, the above scheme does not claim that every
step has to be completed before the next one can be started. Depending
on the goals of the reform, steps may be taken simultaneously or be
skipped altogether. Nonetheless, the order is logical and should be con-
sulted when considering any reform. And finally, the first step is indis-
pensable in any attempt at judicial reform. Too often has it been forgot-
ten, and too often has this led to the failure of entire programmes. Not
taking this lesson to heart may endanger the entire endeavour of do-
nor-supported judicial reform.
“If it is based on sound knowledge and carried out by
capable people, under relatively favourable conditions, a
strategic, small-step and long-term approach will ultimately
make a difference.”
And this point brings us full circle. As the opening quote by Dan Lev
stated, judicial reform is both exceedingly important and exceedingly
difficult. This Note has outlined a number of reasons for such difficul-
ties and has further demonstrated that there is no shortcut one-model-
fits-all solution when it comes to judicial reform. However, if it is based
on sound knowledge and carried out by capable people, under relatively
favourable conditions, a strategic, small-step and long-term approach
will ultimately make a difference.
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Notes
1 The reader will also find that most of the examples are drawn from Indonesia, as the
author of this note has worked on issues concerning the Indonesian judiciary
extensively, and is best acquainted with the cases in this country. Nonetheless, the
issues discussed are not specific to Indonesia.
2 For an overview of various forms of dispute resolution and the place of courts in this
spectrum, see Shapiro 1986, in particular pp. 1–8.
3 Recently the notion of ‘Access to Justice’ has replaced ADR as a more popular
approach in judicial reform. Unlike ADR, Access to Justice does include common
forms of court procedure, but more broadly conceived it covers many of the ADR
mechanisms. There is a danger here that this will go unnoticed, and that that some
of the lessons to be learned from ADR will not be taken into account in Access to
Justice. Looking beyond labels will hopefully prevent this from happening. On
Access to Justice, see VVI/KREO Research and Policy Note on "Access to Justice and
Legal Empowerment: Making the Poor Central in Legal Development Co-operation",
February 2008.
4 This usually includes judges, but it depends on the particular constellation of the
court concerned.
5 An example of this is the programme sponsored by UNDP and the World Bank in
Sudan.
6 This is of course different in the case of courts performing administrative functions,
such as legalising birth certificates or divorce, but it is crucial to the performance of
courts as dispute resolvers.
7 There may be conscious court politics to delay the publication of judgments. A good
example is the recent judgment of the Indonesian Supreme Court of former
President Soeharto v. Time, ordering the latter to pay almost 100 million US dollars
for defamation, which was sent to the defendant more than a year after it had been
passed.
8 Of course advocates who find that their case has been dealt with differently than
expected may address this matter in public.
9 For examples see Contini & Mohr 2008.
10 Personal communication from ms. N. Colbran, official of the Indonesia Programme
of the Norwegian Human Rights’ Institution (10-4-2008).
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